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A Fresh Look at the Development of
a Market Economy in China1
Rigas Arvanitis, Pierre Miège and Zhao Wei
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translated from the French original by Jonathan Hall
1 Over the last 23 years China’s GNP has increased sevenfold.  In terms of purchasing
power parity (PPP),  China is  number two in the world,  and it  has the sixth largest
volume  of  external  trade.  In  2002,  China  was  the  leading  recipient  of  foreign
investment. These impressive figures are behind the widespread view that the country
is experiencing an “economic miracle”. The special features of Chinese culture, and the
former  system  of  socialist  planning,  are  additional  factors  in  the  mystery  of  this
success.  It  is  also  believed  that  WTO  membership,  which  thrusts  China  into  the
slipstream of globalisation, will totally change the rules of the game in the national
economy.  Under  this  view,  China  is  set  to  become  the  new  world  centre  for
manufacturing,  taking over this  role now current to South-East  Asia.  The optimists
believe that the present phase of modernisation will be completed in the next twenty to
fifty years, making the Chinese economy the largest in the world by 2030. They extend
this Chinese “miracle” to the political sphere, believing that the transformed economy
will have become the driving force in Chinese society. Once the new rules of the game
are in place, the prospects are for the resultant economic development to bring about
the  emergence  of  an  urban  middle-class  bourgeoisie,  and  this  will  favour
democratisation of the regime. Already new generations are growing up in the cities in
an environment strongly affected by the technological revolution and globalisation.
2 In a speech to Chinese academics, Milton Friedman predicted that “anyone who can
give  a  clear  account  of  the  reform  process  in  China,  will  win  the  Nobel  prize  in
economics”. The main focus of all  economic analyses is centred on the institutional
changes,  known  as  “reform  and  opening”  (gaige  kaifang)  implemented  by  Deng
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Xiaoping from 1979 onwards. So every discussion is concerned with trends in economic
policy, and particularly with positing a contrast between the Chinese policy of gradual
reforms 2 and the “shock therapy” adopted by the Soviet Union. But for all this very
real interest, these perspectives remain at the macro-economic level. There is a need to
go  further  and  examine  the  operations  of  the  economic  institutions  and  agencies
responsible for wealth creation, such as the Chinese enterprises,  public institutions,
foreign  investors,  and  organisations  to  promote  technological  development  3.  We
propose  to  take  a  new  look  at  Chinese  growth  by  examining  more  closely  the
operations  of  the  systems  of  production,  since  these  are  the  real  creators  of  that
growth. It is only understanding this that the veil of mystery surrounding the “growth
miracle” will be lifted, as it would anywhere else 4.  We will take the example of the
south,  not  because it  is  China’s  most  dynamic area in economic terms but  because
Guangdong  contains  a  multiplicity  of  productive  systems,  thanks  to  its  being  the
earliest to open up and therefore the fastest to develop5.
3 China is  a  particularly interesting case for economic theory,  and for a comparative
approach to economic and socio-political analyses. It confronts us in a new way with
questions  over  the  role  of  government  in  economic  development6,  forcing  a
fundamental rethink of the social bases of growth. Studies which restrict their analysis
to the gradual transition of the socialist regime to the market economy, such as those
which focus narrowly upon “privatisation”, seem to overlook at least three relevant
areas of investigation: the renewal of the oldest of the systems of production, the role
of  the  state  as  promoter  and  regulator  of  economic  activity,  and  the  degrees  of
efficiency achieved by the systems of production that appeared with the reforms. In
this article we would also like to raise, however briefly, the question of the growth and
durability of the different structures of production. To this end, we will resituate the
empirical studies of separate enterprises within a wider frame of reference, showing
that Chinese economic expansion is largely due to its being investment-driven, and
that the economy itself is still quite a way from being demand-driven. This explains a
considerable number of the practical difficulties encountered by all  the enterprises.
The main question is whether this new economy and its systems of production can
sustain  themselves.  By  “systems  of  production”  we  mean the  totality  of  plant  and
human resources contributing to a productive activity7. A system of production may
include several enterprises; in fact that is frequently the case in developing economies,
where enterprises are subcontracted to those who place orders with them, and whose
brand name appears on the finished product. To restrict discussion to the nature of the
enterprises themselves would be to focus on the internal organisation of each one, and
especially on the nature of its ownership, whereas all  the evidence suggests that in
China the question of  ownership is  less  important  than how the links between the
different  units  of  production  operate  8.  Accordingly,  our  concept  of  a  “system  of
production” puts the emphasis on the arrangements made for the productive process
and its development, as well as on the interrelationship between the sites of production
and their users. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of gross investment in fixed assets (million yuans)
Note: The category of ‘’private enterprises includes individual companies (getihu), enterprises by
shares, and mixed capital companies. The private sector is probably overestimated in this category,
and, on the contrary, collective enterprises are hiding really private companies. See Guiheux, 2002, for
analysis of these categories.
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002 (China Statistical Yearbook 2002), op.cit, Table 6-2, p. 176.
 
The three waves of investment
4 The history of  the rapid growth of  the Chinese economy can be broken into three
successive waves of investment. These waves, and the resulting growth, were not the
fruit  of  an  overall  strategy  on  the  part  of  the  government  and  its  economic  and
financial bodies. They were, rather, the outcome of an accidental conjuncture of some
perfectly identifiable factors.
5 The  first  phase  of  the  expansion  was  the  result  of  the  industrialisation  of  the
countryside, for initially the reforms were aimed at that sector in particular. The ability
to  grow and sell  products  outside  the  state  planning system led  to  a  rapid  rise  in
agricultural  production.  In the early  1980s the profits  from the sale  of  agricultural
products were massively invested in the rural enterprises, the so-called “township and
village enterprises” (xiangzhen qiye). This growth phase lasted six years, from 1983 to
1988. The investments from it were like manna from heaven for the local authorities
and the most adept among the inhabitants of the rural areas. They found themselves in
quite  exceptional  circumstances,  given  the  absence  of  any  competition  and  the
existence of a large demand hitherto unsatisfied by the planned economy. This new
economic opportunity permitted the development of an “economy outside the plan” 9.
There was considerable demand for foodstuffs, clothing and domestic durables. This
demand was initially directed at light consumer producers, but it was later redirected
towards heavy industry. So at this stage, agricultural resources provided the motor for
growth, but the period of rapid expansion was followed, in time-honoured fashion, by a
period of overheating characterised by over-investment. By the late 1980s, the buying
power of the peasantry began to diminish, and the rural market, which represented
75% of the population, could not sustain the growth in demand. At the same time, all
the city families had already satisfied their basic need for durable domestic items, and
the upward curve in demand for agricultural products and clothing flattened out. In
the early 1990s, therefore, this slowing consumer demand could no longer function as
the engine for economic growth. The investment patterns of the previous decade had
been directed towards light industry, which is characterised by short-term production
and rapid returns. The consequence was overcapacity in the durable consumer goods
industry, which meant that the current economic model was no longer viable.
6 The early 1990s saw the arrival of another source of investment, so-called “foreign”
investment,  which mostly  came from Taiwan,  Hong Kong and overseas  Chinese.  In
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1994, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) represented 20% of overall investment. In 2001,
foreign investment from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan continued to represent 18% of
the total (158 billion yuan) and 47.5% of foreign investment in Guangdong province (55
billion yuan) 10.  The Chinese government,  wishing to take advantage of  this  capital
inflow, set up a great number of economic development zones in the coastal regions.
Everywhere “hotels for overseas Chinese” sprang up to accommodate the influx, and
these provided the engine for growth in the first half of the 1990s 11. Some of them, like
Shenzhen, are still  major poles of  attraction for foreign investment.  Investors were
attracted  by  favourable  policies,  the  nature  of  the  labour  force,  and  the  Chinese
market. In addition, the common language and cultural proximity, along with shared
attitudes  towards  combining  political  connections  with  business,  encouraged  this
source of investment. During this phase, two-thirds of foreign investment was in the
hands of small and medium-sized firms from Hong Kong and Taiwan. These made use
of  labour-intensive  production  to  assemble  imported  parts  and  re-export  them  to
supply the international market. This system received the blessing of local officials,
since this economic gold also blessed them with great decision-making powers. The
enterprises involved did not represent direct competition, either with the China-based
township and village enterprises or with the private or state-owned ones. On the other,
hand they contributed towards improving the trade balance and towards increasing
employment and incomes. Moreover, the demand arising from this poorly paid labour
force was directed towards the low-quality products from the communal and the state-
owned enterprises. These profited from the growth in domestic demand, and still do.
That is why all these enterprises survived throughout this period, despite producing
goods which were in many ways outdated (See Figure 1).
7 This growth model, which depended upon FDI from Taiwan and Hong Kong, could have
lasted for at least twenty years, by following the set pattern of integration with foreign
manufacturers.  But  the  Asian  crisis  of  1997  modified  the  underlying  situation.  The
developed economies reduced their orders placed with Chinese enterprises, while the
latter remained essentially geared to the supply of overseas markets. Simultaneously,
the new rates of exchange restored a degree of competitive advantage to the other
Asian countries, by making their production costs attractive again 12.  So this second
engine for growth no longer worked. The third phase of development began at this
juncture, with the arrival of FDI funds from industrialised countries like the United
States, Japan and Europe. The Chinese government reacted extremely fast, by adopting
a whole range of measures to attract this foreign investment. The huge campaign in
favour of entry into the WTO must be understood in this context. That is why WTO
membership became the main objective of official policy. Since 1997, investment in real
estate  has  greatly  increased,  and the  big  cities  have  become showcases  for  China’s
growth  13.  Forthcoming  events  like  the Peking  Olympic  Games  in  2008,  and  the
Shanghai  Universal  Exhibition  in  2010,  provide  an  additional  seductive  appeal  to
international investors. As a consequence of the spectacular take-off in international
investment,  capital  inflow  from  Taiwan  and  Hong  Kong  has  picked  up  again,  and
continues to be an important part of the overall FDI in China (See Figure 2).
8 Between 1978 and 2002, the value of Chinese exports rose from 10 billion US dollars to
226 billion. In the 1980s, income from exports stimulated domestic demand for basic
consumer goods. In the 1990s, exports gave a stimulus to the demand for sophisticated
electronic consumer goods, particularly household equipment, making the export trade
a major engine for growth. In the second half of the 1990s, China set about stimulating
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demand in the sphere of tourism, real estate, and car production. In these ways, the
reforms  launched  by  Deng  Xiaoping  have  paved  the  way  for  expansion  in  both
consumption and production.
9 In  a  well-known  article  in  Foreign  Affairs,  Paul Krugman  defines  the  nature  of  the
growth in East Asian countries as an effect of resource mobilisation, not of increasing
productivity. He was commenting on a little-known article by Alwyn Young 14 and his
article  concludes  that  Asia  has  achieved  remarkable  growth  rates  without  any
corresponding increase in productivity. In his view, these growth rates were more the
outcome of mobilising available resources than of increasing efficiency. In short, it was
a  matter  of  “more  perspiration  than  inspiration”  15.  Essentially,  China  has  been
following this model of accumulation, with variations of its own.
 
Figure 2: Evolution of foreign investments (US$ billion)
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002, op. cit, Table 6-3 p. 177, ‘source of funds’.
 
Figure 3: Industrial production by type of enterprises, 2001. Comparison between China and
Guangdong (billion of yuans)
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002, op. cit, Table 13-3 p. 425.
10 Firstly, average individual income is low and the level of household savings is high. The
rapid  increase  in  China’s  GNP in  the  first  stage  of  growth was  accompanied by  an
increase in income disparities. Secondly, given the size of the Chinese economy and the
importance of regional disparities, a single wave of investment is simply not enough.
Thirdly, the Chinese state has a powerful capacity for mobilising resources, and has
been able to make use of the structures of production which were actually introduced
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to ensure social and political stability. This mode of economic organisation lies at the
very heart of its current difficulties.
 
Productive systems piled on top of each other
11 To leave the analysis of the “Chinese miracle” at this juncture would be to commit the
error of looking only at the macro-economic data—like the break-up of the economy
into separate spheres, the decentralisation of power, and the return of former evils like
corruption, gangs, prostitution etc.—taking note only of the consequences rather than
the causes of the economic changes 16. Our view is that these causes are to be found in
the systems of production. With each wave of resource mobilisation, there have arisen
new enterprises with their own distinct systems of production. It is these which have
engendered the growth in production and returns on investment.
 
The rural enterprise systems of production
12 The first type of productive systems are the township and village enterprises. These
enterprises  grew up  in  the  early  1980s,  and  operate  as  private  companies,  but  for
reasons  of  ideological  acceptability  they  are  officially  registered  as  collective
enterprises  17.  They  work  with  raw materials  and  employ  low-cost  labour,  and  are
concentrated in various sectors of production, which they quickly came to dominate 18.
13 At the same time, the larger collective enterprises already in place started to operate as
“private”  firms.  A  good  example  of  this  is  the  Yueqing  enterprise  in  Shuikou
(Guangdong  province).  Starting  as  a  tap  manufacturing  plant,  it  modernised  and
became  the  organising  centre  of  a  myriad  of  small  plumbing  firms.  Consequently,
Shuikou township is now at the head of a whole industrial sector selling to the entire
country. A large number of other enterprises have set themselves up along the same
lines,  both  in  Guangdong  and  in  the  rest  of  China. Well  known  brand  names  like
Legend, TCL, Hai'er, Konka and Galanz are similar enterprises that arose with the first
phase of expansion, and prospered mostly because their status as collective enterprises
gave them access to public funds (see Figure 3).
14 All these enterprises 19 were primarily suppliers to the domestic market, only turning
later to production for export. Galanz in Shunde, a town close to Canton, is typical. It
started as an assembly plant for microwave cookers, whose step-up transformers and
magnetron tubes were imported from Japan for US$20. The same components imported
from  Europe  cost  US$30.  The  leaders  of  the  enterprise  made  a  quick  visit  to  the
European manufacturers and offered to buy transformers at US$8 and become the Own
Equipment Manufacture (OEM) producer for the European firm 20. The Europeans made
their  own  rapid  calculations  and  accepted  the  offer.  They  transferred  all  their
equipment and production lines to Shunde, including their assembly technology. The
Japanese offered the same OEM arrangement, with a purchase price for the transformer
of US$5. Today Galanz produces the transformer in situ for US$4, and the enterprise
claims to control 30% of the world market and 70%-80% of the domestic market. How
has  that  been  possible?  In  an  interview,  the  owner  explained  that  in  Europe  the
production line runs for six hours a day, and five days a week, adding: “Because of
strikes, they actually only work an average of four days, or between 24 to 30 hours a
week. I took over their production techniques and set up a system of three eight-hour
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shifts, which works out at a 160-hour week. My productivity is six to seven times higher
than in Europe, but each wage bill is between 3% and 5% of the European wage”. 
15 The success of these enterprises is to be explained not only by the match between the
foreign clients’ search for low costs and Chinese productive capacity, but also by their
entering into a stable exchange system along OEM lines. The Galanz factories produce
on behalf of two hundred multinational firms from every quarter of the globe. The
Chinese enterprise takes care of the manufacturing end while the technology, brand
name, and marketing remain in the hands of the foreign multinationals. It is striking
how quickly the enterprise has grown, which is why it is a frequently cited example.
The  quest  for  increased  turnover  is  a  constant  factor,  with  the  enterprises  taking
advantage of their low production costs. In addition, such enterprises actively seek out
foreign partners to ensure access to technology and market outlets. What the Chinese
enterprises are looking for is this technology transfer, both material (in the form of
products,  equipment,  and  processes)  and  organisational  (quality  control  and
management skills).
 
The systems of production set up by the overseas Chinese
investment
16 A second type of production system appears in enterprises which were established by
the  second wave  of  investment  from Taiwan and Hong Kong.  Industries  producing
textiles and clothing, electronics and electrical household goods, were relocated to the
Pearl River delta. These enterprises share some features with those of the first wave,
but  they  also  have  some  specifics  of  their  own.  Firstly,  the  investors  not  only
established the enterprises, but brought with them their own networks of suppliers and
customers. The Taiwanese and Hong Kong enterprises which set themselves up on the
mainland to take advantage of low production costs, were backed by more than thirty
years experience as suppliers to the multinationals. In addition, they have their own
way of  doing business,  to  which the entrepreneurs  from Guangdong were quick to
adapt. Secondly, they had more complex production techniques, even in the case of less
sophisticated industries like shoes, clothing and basic electrical goods. Thirdly, these
overseas Chinese established strong ties with mainland officials and local government
bodies. They brought the local power structures into the very operations of their own
systems of production. More effectively still, in an increasing number of cases, the local
authorities  appealed  to  them to  help  strengthen technological  development  and to
launch  technical  education  initiatives  (such  as  practical  demonstrations,  technical
training,  and  apprenticeship  schemes).  There  were  also  centres  to  promote
technological innovation, aimed at providing technical know-how to enterprises in a
particular sector of production (for example, shoes and underwear in Nanhai). In the
industrialised world such centres are usually organised by the chambers of commerce
or public education bodies. In China, they are handled by the joint enterprises, to which
a foreign partner brings both its expertise and its market.
17 In the Pearl River delta area, these enterprises owned by foreign capital employ thirty
million workers from the most impoverished provinces of China. There are reckoned to
be another thirty million potential migrants in the inland provinces, which guarantees
continuing low labour costs. The foreign enterprises have easily been able to make use
of  this  situation,  turning  the  whole  area  into  one  huge  factory,  with  intense  local
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concentrations according to the type of products. Shunde is the main centre in China
for the manufacture of electrical household goods, Ronggui is the largest centre in the
world for air-conditioning unit production, Shaxi is the centre for leisure wear, Humen
(Dongguan) for clothing, etc. 21
18 Dongguan,  which  is  close  to  the  border  with  Hong Kong,  is  an  example  useful  for
examining the operation of the systems of production financed by FDI from Taiwan and
Hong Kong. Dongguan is a relatively small town which serves as a centre of production
for a great number of specialised products: coffee, computer mice, and other computer
components. Its systems of production are known by the expression sanlai yibu (literally
“three resources and one obligation” (22)), and are similar to the Mexican maquiladoras,
in  which  products  are  manufactured  from  imported  materials,  and  assembled
according to models provided by the foreign client. The industrialisation of Dongguan
began in the early 1980s, well ahead of the surge in the second wave of investment in
the rest of the country, thanks to the relocation of industries from Hong Kong 23. The
driving force  behind its  growth has  been the manufacture of  OEM products  for  its
clients.  Since  1989,  Dongguan  has  attracted  numerous  Taiwanese  enterprises
specialising in information technology and shoes, and these have built up a network of
local suppliers to reduce the time and cost expended in purchasing raw materials and
parts, while meeting the standards set by the needs of international clients. The supply
networks provide a link between local and foreign enterprises. They are all members of
a  single  constituted  system of  production:  customers,  suppliers  and  manufacturing
units are all closely integrated, and the whole system benefits from the comparative
advantage  of  cheap  labour.  The  parameters  are  set  by  the  global  market,  and
contributions from the local authorities in terms of innovations or technical support
are minimal. The key question confronting these systems of production is how to move
on from the stage of  providing low-cost  assembly to  foreign customers,  to  become
complete OEM suppliers, or even achieve ODM (Own Design Manufacture) status 24.
19 By the end of the 1990s this system had reached its limits 25.  Production costs were
relatively high in comparison with other regions of China. Foreign enterprises were
being  set  up  in  China  with  their  own  supplier  networks,  and  some  regions  were
becoming direct competitors.  In Suzhou, close to Shanghai,  a number of firms have
taken advantage of the cheaper local labour and the availability of direct links with the
multinationals. Consequently Suzhou is now about to overtake Dongguan as the world’s
largest producer of computer parts. The Shanghai and Zhejiang region has entered into
direct competition with Guangdong 26. The exhaustion of the model of production in
Dongguan  is  due  to  the  difficulty  in  upgrading  the  systems  of  production.  This
illustrates  a  key  point  in  the  theory  of  industrial  development,  namely  that  the
creation of enterprises is a process quite distinct from their development (see Figure 1)
27.
 
The systems of production set up by FDI
20 The third wave of investment was provided by the industrialised countries. Currently,
numerous “third generation” systems of production are being piloted by foreign firms.
The  four  hundred  largest  of  these  have  investments  in  China.  The  world’s  leading
manufacturers of telecommunications and oil industry equipment, cars and machine
tools, have already set up their own production networks in China. These investments
are  often  focused  on  the  Shanghai  region.  Foreign  firms  begin  by  setting  up  a
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representative’s  office,  and then establish  their  production sites.  Foreign investors’
objectives are no longer just to relocate the manufacturing process to cut costs and
then re-export, but to develop a market in China itself (see Figure 4).
 
Table 1: Basic indicators of foreign companies. Investments and exports (US$ million)
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002, op. cit, Total Exports: table 17-10, p. 626; Investments: table
17-20, p. 636.
 
Figure 4: A scheme of the piling-up of productive systems
21 These new systems of production are still at a preliminary stage, and the foreign firms
involved are beginning to perceive the problems which any enterprise must encounter,
in whichever country it first sets up operations 28. Even those foreign firms which are
already established are still finding it difficult to make any profit. For a foreign firm
everything  is  more  expensive  in  China,  from  land  purchase  to  building  costs,
installations, employee recruitment and training, communications with headquarters,
relations  with  government  offices  handling  labour  and  the  environment,  and
commercial dealings with suppliers. It is more expensive to set up an integral system of
production than to collaborate with a local supplier (see Figure 5).
22 Unlike the systems of production established under the first two waves of investment,
these firms have no difficulty making use of efficient managerial techniques, and in
setting up organisational structures geared towards their production goals and their
market.  Their  difficulties  arise  solely  from  their  relations  with  their  social
environment. The future legal and institutional setting within which they will operate,
will be a decisive factor for these “third generation” systems of production, and so the
foreign investors who back them are relying on the complete opening of the Chinese
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economy in accordance with international agreements. It is still too early to make a full
assessment of this third wave, and of the eventual outcome of the super-imposition of
these three different systems of production on top of each other.
 
Do the state enterprises amount to a distinct system of production?
23 Discussions  of  the  modernisation  process  in  China  tend  to  focus  mainly  on  the
emergent systems of production, namely on those which arose after the opening-up
reforms. But there is another system of production which is easily overlooked because
it is out of harmony with all the talking up of the “miracle”. This system of production,
namely  the  state  sector,  plays  a  very  important  role  in  the  economic  ethos  of  the
country.
24 Before the reforms, China was a socialist country whose economy was based on the
state  enterprises.  The  enterprises,  the  Party  administration,  the  schools,  and  the
hospitals  were  all  single  “work  units”  (danwei),  and  were  in  turn  all  completely
integrated into the structure of the planned economy of the single-party state. These
“work units” were there not only to produce goods, or supply services and training;
they  were  also  charged  with  major  administrative,  political  and  socio-economic
functions (like health, education, housing and ration coupon distribution), fulfilling the
role of different areas of state administration. This system still remains the social and
economic  basis  of  the  so-called  “socialist  market-economy  system”.  The  different
newly  emergent  systems  of  production  have  established  themselves  on  top  of  this
underlying economic and political  basis  of  society.  For  over  twenty years  now,  the
reforms have been seeking to improve the operations and achievements of the state
enterprises,  while also making their property rights and management powers more
transparent,  but  without  dismantling  the  enterprises  themselves,  along  with  the
political and administrative apparatus of which they are a part. So even though the
planned  economy  may  have  disappeared,  this  economic  and  political  system  still
remains.  As  the  new  millennium  dawns,  this  system  still  includes  government
administrative  offices  and  Party  organs,  both  central  and  local,  along  with  social
organisations, and state monopolies like banking, radio and TV, and the other media.
25 The state enterprises are the very heart of this system. Although they have lost many of
their markets to the new systems of production, they still enjoy privileged access to the
financial  resources  of  the  country.  Between  1985  and  1992,  the  share  of  the  state
enterprises in the GNP fell by 6%, but their financial resources only went down by 4.7%.
Since  1992,  the  share  of  the  state  enterprises  in  overall  industrial  production  has
continued to decline, but their investments have been increasing by 1.5%. In the 1980s,
the government transferred considerable resources to the state enterprises by reducing
the taxes on their returns. Next, in order to continue its financial support to the state
sector, in the early 1990s the government introduced the sale of public debt in the form
of bond issues, and then, in the second half of the decade, it organised support through
bank loans,  making it  easy for the state enterprises to obtain credit  at  preferential
rates. More recently, the government has set up and supported the stock markets with
the same goal of financing the state sector. In this way the state enterprises benefit
from public financial resources unavailable to the so-called “private” firms, and at the
same time they have greater ease of access to other types of resource like, for example,
the publicly funded research centres and universities 29. At the present time, the policy
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of supporting industrial giants (zhuada fangxiao), which is still far from successful, is
centred on several very large-scale public enterprises 30.
26 The state enterprises have not only used their privileged access to finance investment
in production. Over the last two decades, a large part of their investments have gone
into housing their employees, and into funding social security payments and pensions,
that is to say, into the social benefits needed to maintain social stability.
27 With  the  coming  of  the reforms,  the  state  enterprises  underwent  major
transformations,  but  their  basic  nature  has  not  changed.  There  is  no  question  of
entirely  privatising  the  state  sector,  but  rather  of  selling  off  certain  parts  of  it  to
procure new sources of finance. But the offers of shares for management buy-out did
not  deliver  the  promised results,  and they have since  become the focus  of  intense
debates over the chances for personal gain which they afford. A large proportion of
these systems of production are in decline, and their future depends on the ability of
the government to keep up the flow of investment towards them. The banks and the
stock exchange seem only to exist to channel this flow in their direction. And despite
everything, these public enterprises still enjoy easier access to other major resources,
of a technological nature, than the other kinds of enterprise 31. So, to a large extent, the
challenge facing the state enterprises is to improve their ability to produce more and to
innovate.
 
Uncertainties over the behaviour of the various
economic players
28 How long will these growth engines continue to perform? And how long can the
present  structure of  the Chinese economy be sustained? These persistent  questions
dominate all the debates about China. To answer them, a fundamental reflection on the
nature of the market economy is unavoidable 32.
 
Figure 5: Investments in fixed assets China (left) and Guangdong (right) (billion of yuans)
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2002, op. cit, Table 6-2 p. 176.
29 Economic development requires trust: that means trust in oneself and in one’s own
working  tools,  and  trust  in  the  other  economic  performers,  but  also  trust  in  the
institutions and the rules of the game 33. It has become commonly acknowledged since
the work of Karl Polyani and the economic anthropologists (34), that this latter form of
trust  is  an  indispensable  component  of  any  economic  system.  This  non-material
element is a necessary supplement to capital and labour. Mutual trust is the basis for
the long-term development of systems of production.
30 Although the contribution of trust to economic performance is difficult to quantify, it
can be clearly stated that the ability of the economy to continue functioning over a
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long  period  requires  certain  rules  and  accepted  norms  to  underpin  the  relations
between the various economic actors. Does this trust between the agents themselves,
and towards  the  economic  system as  a  whole,  exist  in  China today?  Have the new
systems of production contributed towards its emergence? Has the arrival of a private
ownership  economy  promoted  those  rules  in  the  operations  of  the  market  which
respect the rights of the different actors, consumers, enterprises and workers alike?
31 Economists who favour the process of gradual change in the Chinese economy give a
positive answer to these questions. Their argument is that the gradual introduction of
private  enterprise  is  forcing  the  economic  system  to  adopt  the  contractual  rules
necessary for its satisfactory functioning. And indeed, the sheer number of economic
reforms,  and  the  massive  redrawing  of  legal  provisions,  give  some  grounds  for
believing in the progressive adoption of new rules which will pay greater respect to the
rights of others, and will be less arbitrary in the application of legal sanctions 35. If this
proves to be the case,  China will  have found the magic formula for moving from a
socialist economy to a market-based one, without any noticeable crisis, and within a
political continuum free from upsets on the scale of those which Russia encountered at
the time of the implosion of the socialist system there.
32 Better still, according to this view, the population as a whole, and more particularly
those who are involved with the emergent systems of production, seem to believe that
economic success is all that counts, whether it is that of an individual or of the overall
system, and that this individual or collective success will give rise to an improvement
in the law, and in social and judicial norms. In sum, the idea is that progress will be the
fruit of economic success. Paradoxically, this idea is supported by the legacy from the
old  socialist  ideology  which  proclaimed  a  strong  belief  in  economic  determinism.
Developments in other domains are supposed to come as a result of economic changes
(36),  so  most  intellectuals  seek  economic  explanations  for  social  and  political
developments 37.
33 But we should recall that this widely shared belief is itself very new, and it contains two
weaknesses.  Firstly,  only the success stories are highlighted in connection with the
emergent systems of production, and only the strengthening of the private sector is
given any consideration, not its failures 38. Secondly, the state enterprise system and
the overall political structure, which remain firmly under the operational control of
the rules governing the Party and the state,  are forgotten. Simultaneously with the
appearance of the new systems of production, there was a decentralisation of political
power  to  enable  greater  flexibility  in  the  chains  of  command,  and  this  was
accompanied by an increase in the personnel employed within the new structure 39. At
the provincial and municipal levels, the political structures involved saw the birth of a
greater  freedom of  action  and  a  lessening  of  disciplinary  control  from the  central
government. The actors on the lower rungs of the ladder were able to work in their
own interests 40. Following the reforms, the fiscal powers of the state were reduced, and
the commercialisation of the public administration and services was a response to this
new situation. The local governments have set up a lot of agencies which charge fees
for formerly free services. The universities now charge for their courses. The schools
and private colleges have enrolment fees. The hospitals sell their medicine at very high
prices.
34 The government is encouraging this galloping commercialisation, while at the same
time preaching against corruption 41.  But the state itself supports these transactions
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because it  needs the financial  resources which they provide.  People’s  dealings with
government agencies are assuming the nature of commercial transactions, like most
social relations in China nowadays. This logic of immediate economic interest, without
a safety net or institutional restrictions, affects all social activities, inside or outside the
political structure.
35 This unlimited reign of an “axiomatic of interest”, as Alain Caillé calls it, appears to us
to  dominate  the  entirety  of  Chinese  society.  The  new  systems  of  production  have
favoured its development, and in the realm of interactions between private economic
actors, the overriding rule is competition at all costs, with no regard for trust, and with
no  other  criterion  than  success  or  failure  42.  The  really  fierce  competition  is  not
between the state enterprises or the multinationals, but between the large number of
small enterprises, and this has an enormous effect on prices 43.
36 Even in the coastal regions, despite their being more open and more accustomed to free
market transactions, there is daily evidence of this lack of trust and an absence of clear
rules governing business conduct. Not only do enterprises look mostly for short-term
profit, without bothering about long-term capital accumulation, but they also seek to
avoid  partnerships  and  external  input.  They  focus  on  speed,  rapid  expansion,  and
competitive prices. Even when they know each other by name, which is often the case,
the owners of  enterprises  producing the same items and in the same municipality,
never inform each other of their training needs or their labour problems. The large
number of dinners which they attend are merely intended to show that everything is
alright, not to discuss together their technical, legal or economic needs. A shared space
for social intercourse is far from being established. As for the imposition of any official
limitation,  for  whatever  motive  (including  labour  and  environmental  protection
rights), this appears to such proprietors as an unacceptable state encroachment into
private business, and an infraction of the mandate: “Enrich yourselves!”. Finally, our
interviews have shown that the enterprises know their clients well enough, but they do
not know the state of their market. Only very few of the owners are able to say whether
their market is rising or falling, and very few can give an indication of its size, whether
at the national or regional level. This uncertainty is quite clearly at the heart of their
behaviour.
37 Even the state enterprises are forced into this competitive pattern (44), although it is in
marked contrast to the known and respected rules which pertain in the political order.
Both Chinese and foreign economists talk of an opposition between the market and the
state. However, the crucial factor is not to be found in this opposition between the
public  and the “private” sectors,  but  rather in the difficulty of  even imagining the
emergence of an economic sphere outside the political system, in which confidence in a
shared respect  for  the rules  would itself  be  the rule  rather  than the exception.  At
present, it even seems rather difficult to maintain that Chinese society is dominated by
the market economy, because it  lacks the essential  ingredient of  such an economy,
namely respect for the rules which underpin mutual trust. In its place there is deep
uncertainty, and this engenders opportunist behaviour, whatever the existing property
laws or the kind of market in operation, private or public. That is why it seems vain to
believe  that  the  growth  of  the  structures  of  production  outside  state  control  will
eventually lead to the adoption of rules which will inspire trust in the proper workings
of the market. All indications are that the rules based on the socialist system are still
firmly in place.  Such things as the laws restricting personal freedom of movement,
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budgetary rules, employment laws, purchase regulations in the public markets, and the
lack of trustworthy statistics, are all signs that there has been no change in the political
system. And in the absence of any rules and standards of proper conduct, established
not by force but by general consent (45), all that remains is the Hobbesian war of all
against all. In the final analysis, this is the actual condition of all the economic relations
outside the state, while the latter simply acts as a benevolent onlooker.
38 For all  the enterprises  set  up by the first  wave of  investment,  survival  is  achieved
through  meeting  immediate  demand,  and  this  depends  on  extremely  short-term
calculations. The very few enterprises which seem capable of reaching a higher level, in
technical expertise and in relations with their suppliers and customers, are those which
often just happen to have a joint agreement with a foreign partner, or those whose
market conditions just happen to force them to make more dynamic choices, such as
investing  in  research  and  development  (R&D),  or  undertaking  engineering
improvements. But in any given town, such enterprises can be counted on the fingers
of one hand, and in a whole region they amount to no more than a few dozen 46. The
enterprises belonging to the second wave of investment depend for their survival on
their ability to offer their clients a range of OEM items, an ability which they have
usually  developed  before  setting  themselves  up  in  China.  Finally,  the  Western  and
Japanese enterprises which have established operations in China have done so precisely
for long-term strategic goals, namely to be present as players on the Chinese market 47.
For these companies the improvement of the legal framework is of crucial importance
48.
39 For its part, the state enterprise system of production is destined to continue. This is
not  because  of  any  economic  logic,  but  because  of  a  decision  to  support  them for
political and social reasons. For these enterprises, modernisation is still on the agenda.
Until now, the modernisation of the state sector enterprises has only been considered
from the angle of the ownership of capital. It has been just a question of share sales,
financial takeovers, and debt cancellations. But for the state enterprises themselves, as
for  the banks,  productivity  remains  a  key question.  This  involves  improvements  in
management efficiency, the introduction of planning capabilities, the development of
the engineering and R&D side, and the ability to actively adapt and improve products
and  procedures.  All  these  aspects  of  innovation  seem  to  us  not  merely  useful  but
absolutely necessary. What is at stake is not the present sharing of the diminishing pile
of goodies, but increasing these firms’ capacity to produce real value.
40 In  the immediate  future,  the new systems of  production will  still  need to  feed the
political structure and the state enterprises financially. But they are no longer capable
of  sustaining  the  national  growth  by  themselves.  To  achieve  this,  a  new  wave  of
investments must be encouraged. If growth is to continue in the future, new systems of
production  will  have  to  appear  on  the  scene.  Moreover,  the  different  systems  of
production will find themselves increasingly engaged in collaborative activities.
41 It is too soon to foretell whether a business ethos will take root in China, along with its
accepted norms to underpin mutual trust. There is nothing in the present behaviour of
those involved which would allow us to believe that there will be a real crystallisation
of the private sector in China along these lines. Nor is it possible to believe that the
present  generation  of  entrepreneurs  will  distinguish  themselves  by  their  ethical
choices.  But  it  is  possible  that,  under  pressure  from  foreign  competition,  better
distribution networks and a greater market sophistication may be introduced. If  so,
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some  enterprises  could  be  encouraged  to  undertake  bolder  ventures.  All  this
presupposes solid support from the state, linked to a strategy for the various sectors,
and to thorough-going training schemes, as the examples of Japan and South Korea
amply  demonstrate.  Sustaining  growth  has  to  go  through  a  strengthening  of  the
systems of production currently in place.
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